No event in the history of the Palestinian cause can be set alongside what happened in the 1948 war—the Nakba and the establishment of the Zionist entity—as can Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and what followed from it in the two years after its launch on 7 October 2023.

This initial view of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, and of what followed it over the past two years, is met with a number of opposing viewpoints. That is only natural given the magnitude of an event which has permitted, even if with some exaggeration, a comparison with the Palestinian Nakba of 1948–1949, that is, the establishment of the Zionist entity and the expulsion of nearly two-thirds of the Palestinian people—though in the opposite direction, or in terms of its significance for the conflict.

The comparison is confined to the scale of the event and the extent of its impact on the Zionist entity, without going into the details or likening them to one another, particularly as regards the displacement that Netanyahu brandishes as a threat. So far, that remains beyond his reach and all but impossible for him to attain.

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Before 7 October 2023, the international situation was marked by signs of decline in American control over the world, with the emergence of major powers such as China, Russia and India, and the growing roles of large regional states such as Iran, Turkey, South Africa and Brazil.

The war in Ukraine between Russia and NATO (2022) had begun to escalate. The Axis of Resistance, made up of Iran, Syria and Yemen together with the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance movements, had been consolidating itself and growing in strength, especially after Hezbollah’s victory in the 2006 war and the victories of the resistance in the Gaza Strip in the wars of 2008–2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021. Alongside this came the escalation of resistance in the West Bank, which moved from the use of knives to what became known as “lone wolf” resistance and, most importantly, to the emergence of pockets of armed resistance in the camps of Jenin, Nur Shams in Tulkarm, and Aqabat Jabr, as well as the “Lions’ Den” phenomenon in Nablus. To this must be added the escalating confrontations at Al-Aqsa Mosque, especially the victorious uprising against the electronic gates in Jerusalem in 2017, as well as the clashes with the “Temple Guardians” and others.

Also to be added is what the Zionist entity itself kept highlighting about Iran’s strength, its possession of ballistic missiles and its technological development, along with what it kept highlighting about Hezbollah’s enormous capabilities: more than 150,000 advanced missiles and a ground strike force of one hundred thousand or more.

In brief and general terms, the Axis of Resistance was advancing and on the tactical offensive. At the same time, however, the Zionist entity was preparing to launch an assault to sweep away the armed pockets in the West Bank, and was threatening to violate Al-Aqsa Mosque by entrenching the practice of religious rituals in its courtyards.

Moreover, the resistance leadership in Gaza announced that a top-secret document had fallen into its hands, prepared by the Zionist army, for a broad surprise offensive to assassinate the leaders of the resistance and strike a number of its positions.

That is why Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was launched when it was: in international and regional circumstances that allowed the resistance, in general terms, to make a great leap forward, and in the wake of the victory and uprising of the 2021 war—an uprising that encompassed the West Bank and the 1948 territories, in addition to a successful exchange of fire in the war in Gaza. This was followed by two military confrontations between the army of the Zionist entity and the Islamic Jihad movement, in 2022 and early 2023.

It should be noted here that Hamas remained, in practice, a rear support for Islamic Jihad without intervening in the two confrontations. It later became clear that this stance—covering for Islamic Jihad without direct intervention—misled the Zionist entity in its reading of Hamas’s policy: the entity was led to believe that Hamas had no intention of confrontation, and that the most it wanted was an easing of the siege and easier living conditions under it. What also helped to mislead the Zionist leadership was Hamas’s encouragement of work for a livelihood inside the Zionist entity.

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It is important to follow Operation Al-Aqsa Flood from six o’clock on the morning of 7 October, as it swept down upon and liberated what is known as the “Gaza Envelope”, which is part of the historic Palestinian land occupied in the war of 1948–1949 and its armistice. This gave Operation Al-Aqsa Flood a meaning and a significance of redoubled importance. The matter was decided in the first two days after the launch, with the attack on the “Gaza Division” and the military defeat inflicted upon it, the like of which the Zionist army had not witnessed since its creation.

More than two thousand two hundred officers and soldiers were scattered—killed, wounded, fleeing or captured—after two hours of fighting. Then came the seizure of a significant number of computers and data files, and then control of the entire Envelope in order to complete the taking of captives (the second tactical objective), with a view to emptying the prisons through an exchange, especially of those serving life sentences.

Following the operation in this way reveals how the enemy was lulled into inattention so that it could be taken by surprise. The plan also succeeded in achieving a military victory over the “Gaza Division”, liberating the Gaza Envelope, and returning with more than two hundred and forty captives.

This in turn reveals something essential: the existence of a resistance leadership of the highest calibre in the qualities it possesses, not only in faith, devotion, morals, courage and daring, but also in intelligence and professionalism (in Abu Obeida’s phrase), sound assessment of the situation, and skill in managing battles, militarily and politically. Perhaps the most important evidence is the readiness the operation provided for confronting a ground war waged by the enemy with all its military might in order to occupy the Gaza Strip, eliminate the resistance—leadership, cadres and members—and then rule the Strip with an iron fist.

The facts of the confrontation between the resistance and the Zionist army, in a ground war that has so far lasted two years, prove the latter’s failure to achieve its objectives. This means a great victory for the resistance in the military confrontation. The facts of the war thereby refute the charge, adopted by some, that Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was an “adventure” that did not reckon with the response to it.

None of this could have happened without the prior preparation of the tunnels and their long-term provisioning with what they needed in water, food, electricity, medicine and weapons (including the manufacture of weapons during the war), and with what the resistance needed even in terms of media and security.

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As for the other argument used by some, it is the charge of having failed to anticipate, or to guard against, the genocidal war that was waged. This argument is void, or untenable, from the outset, because a genocidal war does not enter into any calculation of the expected response, even to an operation on the scale of Al-Aqsa Flood, or one greater than it. A genocidal war is prohibited internationally, and no one can justify or anticipate it—witness the fact that nothing like it has occurred over the past three centuries, in any war in the world, let alone in the wars of the Zionist entity, which used to be very careful to whitewash its record and to claim that it observed international law, or the laws of war.

This is evidence of the political and moral defeat that awaits the perpetrator of the crime of genocide, and those who provide him with cover. It has become a crime to which the world bears witness.

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Hence the genocidal war, with the horrors of mass killing that resulted from it, the destruction of most of the built environment in Gaza, and the accompanying war of starvation and deliberate killing of children, has brought about a revolution in the awareness and conscience of world public opinion, towards a sweeping condemnation, likewise, of the Zionist entity as a war criminal and a killer of children.

In this way the Palestinian cause has become a global cause in human awareness and conscience, as well as one of the major international issues. Perhaps one indication of this is that a number of European states, notably Britain, France and Canada, were compelled to recognize the State of Palestine—in open contradiction with Netanyahu and Trump, who still insist on continuing the genocidal war.

These two outcomes of the war waged on Gaza must be counted as a political and moral victory for the Palestinian people and its resistance in the historic struggle with the Zionist entity, ever since it arose, without legitimacy, on the land of Palestine. They are among the results and repercussions of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, as a legitimate act of resistance that has had an immense effect on the future of the Palestinian cause and on the existence of the Zionist entity.

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It is true that the brutal and painful extermination to which the people have been subjected exceeds any description, endurance or recompense… Yet it has necessarily yielded positive results for the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian people, just as it has yielded moral and political catastrophes for the Zionist entity, now and in the future.

Perhaps there is some consolation in this. Human suffering and blood have been recompensed with martyrdom and divine mercy in heaven, on the one hand; and, on the other, they have not been in vain, but have left a historic victory that will have its sequel, God willing.

Notes:

This paper is the introduction to the book The Flood of Al-Aqsa: Studies in Conflict and Fate published by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies in October 2025.

Book link:

The Flood of Al-Aqsa: Studies in Conflict and Fate

Mounir Shafiq: Arab thinker.


مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية
مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية

The urgency for the establishment for an Arab Unity as a means of reaching independence, solutions to political and economic turmoil, and the establishment a network of cooperation and mutual assistant-ship among countries of the region.

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