{"id":148503,"date":"2026-06-15T10:49:47","date_gmt":"2026-06-15T10:49:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/caus.org.lb\/?p=148503"},"modified":"2026-06-15T10:51:49","modified_gmt":"2026-06-15T10:51:49","slug":"the-2024-lebanon-war-and-the-future-of-conflict-in-the-middle-east","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/caus.org.lb\/en\/the-2024-lebanon-war-and-the-future-of-conflict-in-the-middle-east\/","title":{"rendered":"The 2024 Lebanon War and the Future of Conflict in the Middle East"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction<\/strong><\/h2>\n

One year after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the war that followed in Gaza, events along the Lebanese\u2013Israeli border escalated into an open and comprehensive conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. For many months, the confrontation had been largely confined to border clashes, military engagements, and aerial, missile, and artillery exchanges conducted under relatively defined rules of engagement, following the outbreak of the Gaza war on October 8, 2023. However, during the last three months, the confrontation entered a new phase of escalation, with the Israeli offensive against Lebanon reaching the level of a broad, open war. According to the text, this escalation began with precise security operations and concentrated airstrikes targeting Hezbollah’s senior leadership and thousands of its military and civilian members. These operations reportedly included the sabotage of Hezbollah’s communication and paging devices, as well as attacks on both frontline and rear resistance positions, including tunnels and weapons storage facilities. The campaign also expanded to target Lebanese villages, towns, and areas inhabited by communities considered supportive of the resistance. The article argues that these attacks relied on the same highly destructive aerial bombardment methods that Israel had employed in Gaza since October 8, 2023.<\/p>\n

After nearly a month of sustained Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon, which covered large parts of the country\u2014most notably the southern suburbs of Beirut, where the strikes primarily targeted Hezbollah\u2019s top leadership, headed by the party and resistance leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah\u2014Israel began tactical maneuvers on October 1, 2024, accompanied by military buildups along the border in preparation for its ground offensive against Lebanon. The following day, Israeli army forces began attempts to enter Lebanese territory. After nearly two months of these efforts, Israel succeeded in achieving field breakthroughs along some frontline positions and border villages, despite facing fierce and concentrated resistance that inflicted numerous fatalities and injuries among its ranks, particularly among elite Israeli army units, and destroyed dozens of tanks and military vehicles.<\/p>\n

At the same time, several Lebanese regions inhabited by communities supportive of the resistance continued to be subjected to intense Israeli airstrikes, causing large numbers of civilian casualties, massive destruction of residential buildings, commercial establishments, and service facilities, and cutting transportation routes between Lebanese regions and between Lebanon and Syria. In response, the resistance struck multiple locations inside Israel, including military, security, and intelligence command centers, military manufacturing companies, and logistical support centers and gatherings behind the front lines. Yet, despite the accelerating diplomatic contacts and efforts aimed at reaching a ceasefire agreement, there remains no clear prospect for the end of this war.<\/p>\n

What are the underlying causes of this open and comprehensive war against Lebanon, what are its objectives, what are its possible trajectories, and what are the chances of it expanding into a regional war?<\/p>\n

First: The background of the war<\/strong><\/h2>\n

It is rare for the historical development of societies in dependent countries of the Third World to follow a \u201cnatural\u201d path determined by internal, objective developments, transformations, accumulations, and contradictions within society itself, but rather external factors are often the decisive and intervening force that interrupts their historical trajectory and determines their fate, and what the Palestinian cause and the Arab liberation\u2013Israeli conflict are experiencing in terms of external control over this issue and this conflict has placed both the cause and the conflict between two opposing poles: the pole of the Zionist project of elimination and racial exclusion, supported by and intertwined with the global imperial system led by the United States, which seeks to eliminate the Palestinian cause through military force, violence, and bloodshed, and the pole of the official Arab system, itself governed by the same global imperial system, which seeks to end the Palestinian cause through political deals via a path of normalization with \u201cIsrael,\u201d and the \u201cAl-Aqsa Flood\u201d operation came as a response to the deadlock in which the Palestinian cause was trapped between these two poles, as the noose had tightened around it and even around the lives of the Palestinian people in besieged Gaza for a long time, leaving no option for this people and its resistance except to attempt to break out of this deadlock, and this situation is not far from the position faced by the resistance in Lebanon after October 7, following \u201cIsrael\u2019s\u201d launch of a war of genocide in Gaza, where this resistance also found itself facing only two defined options with no third alternative.<\/p>\n

Thus, the escalation on the Lebanon\u2013Israel front became linked to the developments of the day following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation in the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023. The war of elimination of the resistance and the genocide launched by Israel against Gaza on the day after the Flood placed the resistance in Lebanon before one of two choices: either to open the front in Lebanon, and perhaps the wider region, to its full extent in defense of Gaza and its resistance, and to use all the weapons, forces, and experience it had accumulated over years in a broad or major battle to support the Strip; or to pursue a war of attrition by targeting the Israeli army and keeping it occupied on the northern border in order to relieve the military pressure on Gaza, according to controlled rules of engagement on multiple levels, most notably the type of selected targets in the engagement operations, restricted specifically to military sites and objectives, as well as the geographical range of the engagement zone, which in the beginning did not exceed five kilometers along the front between Lebanon and the territories occupied in 1948. As for what was spoken of as a third option for the resistance in Lebanon, it was put forward by the opposing side, namely the United States and \u201cIsrael,\u201d as well as some Lebanese, regional, and international political actors, calling for keeping Lebanon outside the circle of involvement in supporting Gaza.<\/p>\n

1 – The available options<\/strong><\/p>\n

The situation of the resistance in Lebanon was governed by several conditions and factors that defined its possible choices in confronting the war of genocide being carried out against the Gaza Strip. These conditions and factors completely ruled out the option of non-intervention in support of Gaza. Among them is the fact that the resistance in Lebanon, which represents the spearhead of the Axis of Resistance in the region, has consistently affirmed the centrality of the Palestinian cause and the liberation of Jerusalem in its resistance project, and has long served as a key logistical support for it over decades, and has consistently emphasized the unity of arenas among resistance factions in the region, while Arab and Islamic publics have long relied on it to defend the Palestinian cause. It understood that the genocide war on the Gaza Strip is an Israeli operation aimed at eliminating the Palestinian resistance in its main stronghold, as a prelude to liquidating the Palestinian cause and completing the normalization project in the region. Accordingly, the resistance in Lebanon could not remain passive in the face of what was happening in the Strip, as such a decision would have helped Israel isolate the Palestinian resistance, tighten the siege on the Palestinian people and their cause, and would amount to political suicide for Hezbollah in Lebanon, which would have lost its credibility before the Palestinian people and the Arab public, especially after the Sunni\u2013Shia sectarian divide in the Arab world that the United States and \u201cIsrael,\u201d along with some Arab Gulf states, have worked to deepen since the July 2006 war and then after the \u201cArab Spring,\u201d with the aim of weakening Hezbollah\u2019s popularity in the Arab street\u2014a divide that would have deepened further had Hezbollah stood by watching Gaza being exterminated. In addition, Israel would have moved to strike Hezbollah after finishing with Gaza, regardless of the position the party would have taken toward the war in the Strip.<\/p>\n

This confined the options of the resistance in Lebanon to one of two choices: either the option of a wide-scale war, meaning a major war, based on the principle of the unity of arenas for which the Axis of Resistance had openly declared its preparedness; or the option of a limited war according to controlled rules of engagement, with clearly defined mission and dimensions, centered on supporting Gaza and demanding an end to the genocide war being waged there.<\/p>\n

2 \u2013 The surrounding conditions<\/strong><\/p>\n

The option of a wide or major war in defense of Gaza and the Palestinian cause faced logistical and strategic obstacles for most actors within the Axis of Resistance, which prevented the resort to that option at that time. The economic, social, and political conditions in most countries of the Axis are deteriorated and exhausted, either due to the repercussions of the Arab Spring and the wars, foreign occupations, and social destruction it triggered in more than one Arab country; or due to the policies of economic strangulation practiced by the United States against one country or another in the region; or due to the economic, social, and political policies adopted in those countries, which have failed to achieve development, combat poverty, unemployment, and corruption, and provide a dignified life for their populations, freeing them from hunger, fear, and authoritarianism; or due to the presence of sharp political divisions over issues of identity and major national choices within some Arab societies. All of this has had repercussions and effects even within the environment of the resistance itself.<\/p>\n

And at the military level, the Gaza war confirmed from its very first day that the conflict in the region has both an existential dimension on the one hand and a global imperial dimension on the other, which ultimately are two sides of the same coin. Accordingly, the Axis of Resistance does not merely represent an obstacle to the Zionist project, but also to the system of imperial domination over the region and the world led by the United States. Thus, Israel would not be alone in any war it faces, as it is an essential component and forward spearhead of the global imperial camp led by the United States, representing the most protected and heavily armed forward base of this camp, while also safeguarding Western economic interests and reflecting its racist cultural background. All of this required that any confrontation with Israel take into account the military, intelligence, financial, and logistical support that Israel would receive from its allies in such a war, especially since a major, region-wide war would entail classical military confrontations in which quantitative and qualitative techno-military superiority would lean in favor of the Western\u2013Israeli camp.<\/p>\n

3 \u2013 Cost\u2013benefit calculations<\/strong><\/p>\n

Thus, the decision to enter into a major confrontation with Israel in the region, especially on the basis of a classical war, was already constrained by a structural imbalance in military, security, and technological power between the parties to the conflict. It is natural that the balance of power between the Axis of Resistance and \u201cIsrael,\u201d along with the imperial camp, is highly asymmetrical, and this has a well-known historical and political-economic cumulative dimension. Therefore, despite what the Axis of Resistance has accumulated in terms of military capabilities in classical weaponry and guerrilla warfare\u2014particularly at the level of ground combat tactics and anti-armor weapons, which have deprived the Israeli army of its traditional battlefield superiority, as well as missile capabilities and drones that have partially broken some aspects of absolute Israeli air superiority, and underground infrastructure at both of the aforementioned levels\u2014these capabilities do not provide sufficient strategic conditions for the countries of this axis to enter a large-scale classical war against Israel and guarantee victory in it, especially when measured against objectives of such magnitude. This is particularly true given that the conditions for preparing for such a major confrontation, which resistance forces have often hinted at, were not yet complete, as these forces, including Iran, still lack\u2014at a minimum\u2014an effective air defense system capable of countering the overwhelming superiority of Israeli air power, or even that of the West led by the United States, which demonstrated from the first week of the war that it is prepared to go to great lengths in supporting Israel in any such conflict.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, while the Axis of Resistance has primarily relied on developing missile and drone capabilities to break Israeli air superiority, the deployment by the United States and some Western countries of naval forces and ships equipped with air defense systems in the Mediterranean at the beginning of the Gaza war in defense of Israel deprived these missile capabilities of the element of surprise and preemptively limited the effectiveness of any confrontation that might have emerged. This was especially the case after Israel launched its genocidal war against Gaza and reached the peak of its defensive and offensive readiness, with U.S. and Western naval forces concentrated in the region to support it and provide it with ammunition, air defense systems, and intelligence against resistance missiles, drones, and bases.<\/p>\n

In addition to that\u2014and this is the most important point\u2014Israel has managed to reach a new generation of military technology that has fundamentally transformed the concept of warfare. This generation involves artificial intelligence (AI) and the vast data repositories linked to it, which were first deployed on a large scale by the United States and NATO in the war in Ukraine, and by Israel in Gaza, initially in a limited form during the \u201cGuardian of the Walls\u201d operation in May 2021, before being used intensively in the current Gaza war, especially in its early months. It is now also being used by Israel in the war in Lebanon, and it has represented the main element of surprise in favor of the imperial camp in these wars. This is particularly evident in its role in identifying resistance members, recognizing their faces, voices, and locations, eavesdropping on them through their phones, monitoring their movements and tracking them, and ultimately targeting them. It also enables automatic and real-time integration between the battlefield and air power, drones, and artillery based on intersecting live visual, audio, electromagnetic, and geospatial data from the field.<\/p>\n

4 – The difficult decisions<\/strong><\/p>\n

Faced with all these factors, the decision to wage a comprehensive war was neither agreed upon nor practically possible for the various parties of the Axis of Resistance on the regional stage at the beginning of the war on Gaza, especially on the part of Iran, the main supporter of the Axis of Resistance, as a regional state whose decision to go to war is tied to calculations, risks, relations, and the balance of major international powers that Iran did not appear prepared for, despite the transformation of this war into a popular Arab and Islamic demand with the increasing intensity of brutality, criminality, and genocide carried out by Israeli forces in Gaza. The main actors within the Axis of Resistance, concerned with opening such a war in defense of the Strip, were taken by surprise by both the Al-Aqsa Flood operation and the subsequent genocide war, and it was not easy for them to enter a major war whose timing they had not determined themselves, and for which they had not completed their military, security, human, and logistical preparations.<\/p>\n

All these factors tilted the balance toward Hezbollah\u2019s intervention in the war in support of Gaza within the limits of a controlled, limited engagement governed by the aforementioned rules of engagement, through which it sought to relieve pressure on the Gaza front by dispersing enemy forces and keeping a significant portion of its combat units engaged on its northern front along the Lebanese\u2013Palestinian border, which requires a large number of soldiers and logistical units to cover.<\/p>\n

However, as the northern front evolved over time into a serious attritional burden on both the Israeli army and society, due to human and logistical losses and military, economic, and demographic pressures, and as the burden of the Gaza front on Israel decreased after nearly a year of genocidal war there, Israel shifted the weight of its military effort to the northern front with Lebanon under the slogan of returning Zionist settlers to their homes and separating the linkage between the Gaza and Lebanon fronts, and pushing Hezbollah forces away from the border to beyond the Litani River, approximately 40 km from the Lebanese\u2013Palestinian border, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006, under which the 2006 Lebanon war was halted. This shift pushed the resistance in Lebanon to escalate its confrontation with Israel in response to the Israeli escalation.<\/p>\n

Second: The objectives of the war<\/strong><\/h2>\n

1 \u2013 The pre-existing plan<\/strong><\/p>\n

Despite Israeli statements that linked the opening of the northern front with Lebanon to the goal of securing the return of Zionist displaced persons to their settlements and homes in northern occupied Palestine, from which they were forced to flee due to resistance strikes in southern Lebanon, Israel had not ceased, even before launching its war against Gaza following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, from sending political, military, and security messages\u2014official and unofficial\u2014to the region indicating its readiness to expand the scope of confrontation in order to change the geopolitical map of the region through three main objectives: eliminating the Axis of Resistance, ending the Palestinian cause, and ultimately striking Iran, the main sponsor and supporter of the Axis of Resistance, by expanding the confrontation in the region in order to draw the United States into it to strike Iran and its nuclear program facilities, which Israel insists it cannot coexist with even if the program remains within peaceful use; for Israel is the only state in the Middle East that possesses nuclear weapons, and it seeks with all its weight to prevent any attempt to break its monopoly over nuclear deterrence in the region, especially by states that could be hostile to it.<\/p>\n

If the Iranian nuclear program dates back to the 1950s during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and was clearly under American and European sponsorship and support, the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which transformed Iran from a Western and Israeli ally into an adversary of both\u2014placing the liberation of Palestine at the top of its priorities in its national and religious doctrine and in its foreign policy in the region\u2014led the West to abandon its participation in building and implementing this program. \u201cIsrael,\u201d along with some Arab Gulf states aligned with the United States, began urging Washington to strike and halt it by drawing it into a military operation against Iran. This was strongly emphasized by the neoconservatives in the US administration and policy makers since the beginning of this century, and it was therefore on the agenda of US President George W. Bush after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and again after the July 2006 war in Lebanon.<\/p>\n

Over the past decades, Israel has consistently worked to carry out security operations inside Iran against this program, whether through the assassination of scientists linked to it, or through direct sabotage and explosions in some of its facilities, or through efforts to disrupt and hinder it via cyberattacks, the most notable of which was the Stuxnet virus, operated by Unit 8200 of Israeli intelligence, which targeted centrifuges in the program.<\/p>\n

2 \u2013 Preparatory steps for the war<\/strong><\/p>\n

Israel took the decision to open the northern front against Lebanon following the incident in the town of Majdal Shams in the occupied Syrian Golan on July 27, 2024, in which a number of the town\u2019s youths were killed after a missile landed near them. Israel claimed that the missile originated from the resistance in Lebanon, whereas all available evidence indicated that the missile which exploded in Majdal Shams was an Israeli warhead from remnants of the Iron Dome air defense system. However, as in all wars waged by Israel\u2014and by the United States\u2014conflicts begin with a fabricated pretext that is later revealed to be false, with blame shifted onto the other party for allegedly committing an act of aggression. This raises the question: is this war truly aimed at achieving Israel\u2019s stated demands of returning northern residents to their homes and separating the northern front from the Gaza front by pushing Hezbollah forces away from the border, as official Israeli statements claim, or does it aim at something far beyond that?<\/p>\n

In its previous wars, Israel tended not to disclose its final military plan, either in order to preserve its image in case it failed to achieve its declared objectives\u2014thus limiting itself to modest goals close to battlefield outcomes\u2014or in order to leave the door open for expanding its plan if battlefield conditions evolved in a way that allowed it to broaden the scope of its objectives.<\/p>\n

The development of events since the Majdal Shams incident shows that the objectives of the Israeli military operation in Lebanon were not limited to the officially declared goals or to the stated demands of separating the Lebanon front from the Gaza front and pushing Hezbollah elements away from the Lebanese\u2013Palestinian border to ensure the return of settlers to their \u201chomes\u201d in northern Israel. The targeting of around 4,000 Hezbollah military and civilian members using paging and communication devices in two consecutive strikes within 24 hours on September 17\u201318, 2024, followed by the assassination of most of the group\u2019s military leadership within ten days through airstrikes, culminating in the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah himself on September 27, and the launch of intensive air raids across various Lebanese regions where the resistance is present, cannot be confined to those stated objectives. Rather, it appears as a prelude to a war aimed at dismantling and eliminating Hezbollah, within a broader project to strike the Axis of Resistance in the region, including Iran, end the Palestinian cause, and complete Israel\u2019s normalization with the entire Arab region after neutralizing any party that stands in its way.<\/p>\n

Third: Trajectories of the open and comprehensive war<\/strong><\/h2>\n

1 \u2013 The beginning of the open and comprehensive war<\/strong><\/p>\n

Israel began the open and comprehensive war on Lebanon by targeting the prominent Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukr on July 30, 2024, an operation that, in its scale and location, represented a deliberate breach of the rules of engagement with Hezbollah, which had governed the controlled clashes and strikes that began in southern Lebanon against Israeli positions and the corresponding Israeli responses since October 8, 2023. These operations gradually expanded in scope and escalated in intensity over time, either through the widening of the geographical area of aerial bombardments or through the targeting of leaders of the Palestinian resistance, most notably Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri, who was assassinated in the southern suburbs of Beirut on January 2, 2024, and then the head of the movement\u2019s political bureau Ismail Haniyeh, who was assassinated in Tehran on July 31, 2024. This trajectory constituted a series of pre-war developments whose progression was inevitable, given its early and direct connection to the course of the war in Gaza and to pre-established objectives and plans targeting the resistance in Lebanon and the region.<\/p>\n

With this Israeli breach of the rules of engagement represented by the assassination of Fouad Shukr, the resistance in Lebanon had no option but to respond in a manner that preserved the deterrence equation established since the July 2006 war and which it had sought to maintain throughout the subsequent period. The response to Shukr\u2019s assassination came in the form of a drone strike launched by Hezbollah against Israeli security installations on August 24, most notably the Unit 8200 electronic intelligence, cyber operations, and artificial intelligence center in Glilot, north of Tel Aviv.<\/p>\n

After Israel succeeded in decapitating Hezbollah\u2019s leadership at the end of September, it completed its military preparations along the Lebanese border to launch a ground offensive against the party, at a moment when Hezbollah initially appeared to have lost its command-and-control system and unlikely to withstand a ground war, as Israel mobilized around 70,000 troops along the Lebanese border, distributed across five divisions and two brigades, including most of its elite units. Israel began raising the stakes of the operation, speaking of the elimination of Hezbollah, the occupation of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River, or the Awali River north of Sidon, or even as far as northern Lebanon if necessary, and the establishment of a new political order in Lebanon for the post-Hezbollah phase\u2014one that would be friendly to Israel and the United States, which was heavily involved in supporting this plan.<\/p>\n

2 – Launching the ground operation<\/strong><\/p>\n

Israel began its ground offensive on Lebanon on October 1, with extensive and continuous aerial bombardments targeting the defensive fortifications and forward positions of the resistance along the front, as well as most Lebanese areas inhabited by the Hezbollah support base, which were believed to potentially contain weapons depots and rocket-launch and drone-launch sites belonging to the party. At the same time, the Israeli army began moving its ground forces toward Lebanese territory from five axes along the Lebanese\u2013Palestinian border stretching approximately 120 km, starting from Naqoura in the west on the Mediterranean coast and ending at the Shebaa Farms in the east on the Lebanese\u2013Syrian border. The Israeli army divisions were deployed along these axes, according to sources from the operations room of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, as follows: the first axis is the area of operations of the Israeli army\u2019s 146th Division, extending from Naqoura in the west to Marwahin in the east; the second axis is the area of operations of the 36th Division, extending from Ramia in the west to Rmeish in the east (including Aita al-Shaab), and from Rmeish to Aitaroun in the east; the third axis is the area of operations of the 91st Division, extending from Blida in the south to Houla in the north; the fourth axis is the area of operations of the 98th Division, extending from Markaba in the south to the occupied Lebanese village of Ghajar in the east; and the fifth axis is the area of operations of the 210th Division, extending from Ghajar to the occupied Lebanese Shebaa Farms.<\/p>\n

The ground operation was accompanied by a wide range of Israeli and American political statements and positions defining the objectives of this operation and outlining post-war scenarios. Although most of these statements and positions were based on the prior assumption of Hezbollah\u2019s defeat in this war, they varied in the scope of their objectives: ranging from halting rocket fire from Lebanon toward northern occupied Palestine in order to ensure the return of Zionist settlers to their homes; to the implementation of a modified UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and a return to Resolution 1559; to the disarmament of Hezbollah and placing the Lebanese border under international supervision after the war to prevent the entry of weapons to Hezbollah; to the occupation of southern Lebanon, the permanent displacement of its predominantly Shiite population, and the creation of a buffer zone; or even annexing southern Lebanon to the Israeli entity and beginning the construction of Israeli settlements there. At the far end of this spectrum were discussions about expanding the war into Syrian territory, occupying Damascus and toppling the Syrian regime, as a prelude to expanding Israel\u2019s political map through the annexation of additional Arab lands from neighboring states based on the geographical and water-related ambitions that are inherent in the expansionist Zionist project, and reshaping the political map of the Arab Levant on sectarian, religious, and ethnic bases compatible with the religious-racial nature of the State of Israel, after completing the process of eliminating the Axis of Resistance in the region, reducing Iran\u2019s influence, and building a Middle Eastern system fully subordinated to American and Israeli control.<\/p>\n

3 \u2013 Dimensions of the open and comprehensive war<\/strong><\/p>\n

The open and comprehensive war against the resistance in Lebanon unfolded across multiple levels, although it has so far been concentrated geographically in the environment of the resistance and the areas of its presence and movement. Since an open and comprehensive war is not limited to military actions in specific areas but extends to various fields and dimensions, the role of the United States in this war has been evident on more than one level.<\/p>\n

A \u2013 The open war<\/strong><\/p>\n

The open war against the resistance in Lebanon takes three main dimensions: horizontal, vertical, and structural. The horizontal, spatial dimension includes the geography of Hezbollah, its areas of concentration, movement, and institutional deployment\u2014military, civilian, and demographic\u2014as well as the areas of residence of its supporting environment, in addition to its movement routes beyond this geography. Therefore, the Israeli aggression has primarily focused first on southern Lebanon, where the Lebanese\u2013Palestinian border lies, meaning the frontline of combat and the first line of defense of the resistance, while at the same time it is one of the main population areas of its support base, as the villages and towns of southern Lebanon represent the living environment that supplies the resistance with fighters; second, on the Bekaa region, especially Baalbek and Hermel, which also constitute a key stronghold of the party\u2019s support base and therefore another source of fighters, as well as a rear support area for the southern front; and third, on the southern suburbs of Beirut, which represent the main geographical center of the party\u2019s political and institutional structure and the third major source of fighters.<\/p>\n

The vertical dimension relates to the temporal duration of the war, which so far appears open-ended, with its determination linked to the nature of the objectives and the battlefield situation in the ground war, which in turn determines the ceiling of objectives and the temporal scope of the war. The conflict has now entered the final week of its second month, amid fierce resistance faced by the Israeli ground offensive, which has led to a downward revision of ambitions and a narrowing of objectives, and a return to talk of a ceasefire based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701 or a modified version that Lebanon cannot accept. Meanwhile, the southern front continues to witness intense clashes between the resistance and Zionist forces, which are attempting to bypass the frontline Lebanese villages adjacent to the border toward strategic positions, heights, and some interior areas, without succeeding in fully controlling any of these areas or establishing new positions there.<\/p>\n

The structural dimension relates to \u201cIsrael\u2019s\u201d plan to target Hezbollah\u2019s internal structure from within, through the execution of the pager device sabotage operation (September 17\u201318, 2024) and the wireless communication systems used by Hezbollah fighters and civilian operatives. Israel referred to this plan as the \u201cred button\u201d operation, which aimed to destroy the party from within at the push of a button. Through it, Israel reportedly succeeded in infiltrating Hezbollah\u2019s secret communications network and, years earlier, selling it around four thousand pager devices, in addition to wireless communication devices, into which dormant explosive charges were implanted, capable of being remotely activated and triggered by Israel through cyber control. Israel is said to have spent nearly a decade preparing this complex operation, establishing fake factories and companies in Europe and Asia that served as cover through which the shipment of the rigged devices was transferred to Hezbollah. This operation was followed by a series of assassination strikes via air raids against the senior leadership of the resistance, which led to the elimination of most of its top-tier commanders, including Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. This operation, aimed at dismantling the party\u2019s structure, represents one of the dimensions of the open war that paved the way for the launch of the ground offensive.<\/p>\n

B \u2013 The comprehensive war<\/strong><\/p>\n

The comprehensive war targets the different sectoral dimensions of the resistance, its environment, and the arena in which it operates. The most important of these dimensions are the military\u2013security, media, economic\u2013social, and political dimensions.<\/p>\n

At the military\u2013security level, \u201cIsrael\u201d employs in this war all of its military branches\u2014land, naval, air, and space forces\u2014both conventional and \u201csmart\u201d systems. It targets the military structure of the party, both human and logistical, whether in direct confrontation on the front line of the war through the targeting of those it considers resistance fighters, or military positions, weapons depots, ammunition stores, rocket launch platforms, and other military objectives. Drones that continuously patrol Lebanese airspace around the clock play a central role in surveillance and reconnaissance, and thus in continuously updating the target database.<\/p>\n

This is accompanied by Israeli intelligence activity in Lebanon that is no less significant, as Israel continues to operate a large number of agents and spies in order to capture images and collect information about specific individuals, as well as sensitive sites and institutions directly or indirectly linked to the resistance. It is also evident that intelligence and information-gathering activities aimed at targeting the resistance in Lebanon are not limited to Israeli intelligence alone, but involve multiple Western and Arab intelligence agencies, foremost among them the United States intelligence services, in addition to satellites belonging to various states and Western private companies.<\/p>\n

In the media dimension, Israel\u2019s comprehensive war on Lebanon is being covered and reinforced through a wide network of media outlets, newspapers, and social media platforms, both inside Israel and abroad, including channels, newspapers, and websites that are fully biased toward Israel in this war and work to influence Lebanese public opinion by promoting rejection of the idea of Hezbollah\u2019s participation in the defense of Gaza, while also seeking to demoralize the resistance\u2019s support base, spread despair among the public, and promote the Israeli narrative of the war, as well as the ideas of defeat and surrender. It is widely known and evident that many of these Lebanese media institutions receive American patronage or Gulf funding.<\/p>\n

In the economic\u2013social dimension, Israel seeks to destroy the economic infrastructure of Hezbollah and its social environment through the adoption of a scorched-earth policy, involving comprehensive destructive aerial bombardment of villages and towns associated with the resistance\u2019s support base, including shops, agricultural, industrial, and artisanal facilities, popular markets, heritage buildings, archaeological sites, schools, hospitals, mosques, and civil associations, as seen in cities such as Tyre, Nabatieh, and Baalbek, among others. This also includes what occurred with the Al-Qard al-Hassan institution, whose branches across various regions were largely destroyed by Israel on the grounds that it finances Hezbollah and provides salaries to its fighters. It should be noted that Al-Qard al-Hassan is a non-profit charitable institution that provides small loans to the resistance\u2019s social base without any interest.<\/p>\n

In the political dimension, the United States of America directly manages\u2014 in coordination with Israel\u2014 the political aspect of the comprehensive war on Lebanon. In doing so, it operates along more than one track: a negotiation track aimed at ending the war, and a track aimed at establishing a new political system in Lebanon in the post-Hezbollah phase and the disarmament of the resistance, as the United States aspires. It is exerting pressure on Lebanon within the negotiation track to accept a new agreement that would end the war in exchange for the disarmament of the resistance, and the transfer of authority over Lebanon\u2019s land and maritime border monitoring to foreign forces that would guarantee the prevention of any new weapons entering the resistance, as well as granting \u201cIsrael\u201d the right to penetrate Lebanese airspace with its aircraft and drones in order to monitor and counter any military activity carried out by Hezbollah in Lebanon. In other words, the United States, within these negotiations, is demanding the head of Hezbollah, the defeat of Lebanon, and its relinquishment of sovereignty in favor of Israel.<\/p>\n

As for the track of establishing a new political system in Lebanon, the United States seeks to engineer a smooth or soft political transition in Lebanon toward the creation of a system aligned with U.S. policy in the region and oriented toward normalization with Israel, following the elimination of the resistance experience within it, the weakening of Hezbollah, and the termination of its previous political role in Lebanon and the region. Indeed, the U.S. embassy in Lebanon works to manage many aspects of Lebanese political life by intervening\u2014through pressure or incentives\u2014in various political, security, administrative, governmental, and presidential appointments, influencing the military institution\u2019s decision-making, and intervening in parts of the media or most of it, with the aim of laying the foundations for a new phase in modern Lebanese history that would close the chapter of the resistance and liberation role that Lebanon has played since at least the 1950s.<\/p>\n

It is not the first time in modern history that the United States and Israel have attempted to pull Lebanon into their orbit. It was preceded by the attempt to include Lebanon in the Baghdad Pact in 1958, during the presidency of Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, aimed at confronting Gamal Abdel Nasser and the rising liberation movement in Lebanon. The attempt ended with a popular uprising against Chamoun\u2019s rule, which put an end to it. The 1975 attempt, led by the Lebanese Front, particularly the Kataeb Party, sparked a civil war in Lebanon aimed at confronting the expansion of the national liberation movement, progressive forces in Lebanon, and the growing presence of the Palestinian revolution in the country. That war also ended with the entry of Arab Deterrent Forces and the Syrian army into Lebanon to stop it. Then came the 1982 attempt, in which Israel allied with Lebanese Forces leader Bachir Gemayel to invade Lebanon with the aim of eliminating the Palestinian resistance and the national movement in Lebanon, and establishing a pro-Israel political system in Lebanon under Bachir Gemayel, and later his brother Amine Gemayel, who signed a peace agreement with Israel on May 17, 1983 and allowed forces from some NATO countries to establish military bases in Lebanon. This attempt ended with the birth of resistance against the occupation, the assassination of Bachir Gemayel, a civil war that led to the annulment of the May 17 Agreement, and Israel\u2019s phased withdrawal from Lebanon, the last of which was in 2000. It also ended with the withdrawal of multinational forces from Lebanon after suicide attacks that killed hundreds of their members, particularly from U.S. and French forces, and with the Taif Agreement, which ended the civil war. The attempt was repeated in 2004, when the UN Security Council, under Chapter VI, issued Resolution 1559, calling for the disarmament of the resistance in Lebanon and the withdrawal of foreign forces\u2014then represented by the Syrian army\u2014from Lebanon. This came under U.S. and French pressure, and in coordination with some Lebanese political forces, foremost among them former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, the Lebanese Forces militia (whose leader Samir Geagea was then imprisoned on charges including the assassination of Tony Frangieh and the Ehden massacre in 1978, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rashid Karami in 1987, and the assassination of Dany Chamoun in 1990), and the Free Patriotic Movement led by General Michel Aoun (then in exile). The attempt ended with the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, but it failed to disarm Hezbollah or bring about a political transformation in Lebanon in favor of the United States. This paved the way for Israel\u2019s 2006 war on Lebanon to implement what Resolution 1559 and the Lebanese forces calling for its implementation had failed to achieve. That war also ended in a devastating failure of the Israeli offensive and concluded with the end of hostilities under Resolution 1701, without Israel or the United States succeeding in disarming the resistance or changing the political system in Lebanon in their favor.<\/p>\n

Thus, in all these previous attempts to attach Lebanon to American\u2013Israeli projects, the liberation and resistance option in Lebanon prevailed over those projects and over the Lebanese political forces aligned with them, thereby preserving Lebanon\u2019s role and orientation in the region.<\/p>\n

Today, the scene is repeating itself once again in this open and comprehensive war waged by Israel against Lebanon, from which certain Lebanese political and religious authorities\u2014foremost among them the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea\u2014expect the elimination of the resistance and its weapons.<\/p>\n

4 – Collapse of the scene<\/strong><\/p>\n

What was not expected in the ground war on Lebanon\u2014particularly by Israel, the United States, and their allies\u2014was that Hezbollah would restore its command-and-control system within the first days of the war, despite Israel having succeeded in delivering a severe blow by eliminating most of the top leadership of the resistance, including its Secretary-General and highest symbolic figure. It thus faced Israeli ground operations, supported by continuous air and drone strikes, with combat, weapons, and organizational capabilities that prevented the Israeli ground offensive from achieving major gains on the front during the first two months of the war, inflicting heavy human and material losses on the Israeli army that exceeded 1,000 killed and wounded (according to Israeli sources), and the destruction of more than 60 Merkava tanks (according to reports from the resistance operations room), in addition to a number of bulldozers and various military vehicles. Indeed, during the first two months of the war (up to the time of writing), the resistance in Lebanon maintained defensive\u2013offensive operations using rockets and drones deep inside the Zionist entity, particularly in northern \u201cIsrael,\u201d reaching as far as Tel Aviv, which hosts rear bases of Israeli forces participating in the war, along with sensitive military industries and numerous vital and strategic points, especially in the Haifa area, which is densely packed with naval and land bases, as well as military, industrial, and civilian facilities. As a result, \u201cIsrael,\u201d in this war\u2014following the pattern of the Gaza war\u2014has resorted to compensating for the stagnation of its ground offensive by targeting civilian sites and destroying residential neighborhoods in villages and towns, in order to exert further political and psychological pressure on the resistance and its supporting environment, or to create a rift between the party and its base on the one hand, and other segments of Lebanese society, which is politically and identitarily diverse, on the other. This has led to massive destruction in villages and towns and a large number of civilian casualties, exceeding 3,700 martyrs and 15,000 wounded before the end of the second month of the war, including members of ambulance teams, civil defense personnel, and journalists.<\/p>\n

Today, it is evident in the ongoing engagements of the ground war on the southern Lebanon front that the effectiveness and role of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies at the frontlines have declined, after these technologies had succeeded in the pre\u2013ground war phase, since October 8, 2023, in assassinating a large number of resistance fighters. This decline is achieved thanks to the bravery of the fighters who engage and intermingle with enemy soldiers at zero distance on the battlefield, and thanks to the underground infrastructure that has proven\u2014whether in Gaza or Lebanon\u2014to be the most effective and safest means of protecting the resistance, its human elements, military equipment, various weapons, and operations rooms, in a new era of warfare in which every person and every piece of equipment operating above ground has become exposed and vulnerable to targeting, under modern technologies for collecting highly precise and detailed information of all kinds\u2014visual, audio, electromagnetic, and geospatial\u2014and storing and processing it algorithmically, linking it to modern weapon systems to identify and strike targets.<\/p>\n

Thanks to the heroic confrontations faced by the Israeli offensive in the south, the ground advance of the Israeli army appears slow and stalled; however, this ground war remains open to multiple scenarios and outcomes of varying scope, impact, and consequences. The decisive factor in determining the fate of the region remains the battlefield in southern Lebanon, as previously noted, since this front represents the first line of defense of the Axis of Resistance for clear geostrategic reasons: the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon is the strongest and most heavily armed faction among the resistance groups positioned on the direct borders of the Zionist entity, and the southern Lebanon front is the only front within the Axis of Resistance that directly borders the Israeli entity\u2014Palestine\u2014where Lebanese territory intersects with the Palestinian territories occupied in 1948. In contrast, this front is linked to a strategic depth extending to Iran, passing through Syria and Iraq. This is what U.S. and Israeli forces are working to sever, either through control of Syrian territory east of the Euphrates, or through intensified airstrikes on Syria, which in turn is connected to the occupied Palestinian territories via the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.<\/p>\n

In this context, there has recently been growing talk of a ceasefire proposal in Lebanon based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701, as amended according to American and Israeli conditions that, as previously mentioned, call for the distancing of the resistance from the border with the Palestinian territories occupied in 1948; placing all Lebanese borders\u2014land and sea\u2014under the supervision of foreign forces that would prevent the future transfer of weapons to the resistance in Lebanon; and allowing Israel to continue conducting aerial sorties to monitor Lebanese territory and intervene in any military movement or activity by the resistance therein. These conditions are being pushed by the United States and Israel, along with certain other Western and Arab countries, in order to secure their adoption. This would, in practical terms, mean the end of the resistance project in Lebanon and Lebanon\u2019s relinquishment of its sovereignty in favor of American and Israeli control over the region. Therefore, developments in Lebanon appear to remain open to all possibilities, including further military escalation across the entire region.<\/p>\n

Fourth: The regional and international dimension of the war<\/strong><\/h2>\n

1 \u2013 The American and Western role<\/strong><\/p>\n

The United States provides political, intelligence, military, and financial cover for Israel in its war against Lebanon. It also seeks to politically engineer the region after the war in line with its own interests and those of \u201cIsrael.\u201d This is the same policy it has followed since October 8, 2023 in Gaza, as the war in Lebanon represents a complementary link to the Gaza war within the American strategy in the Middle East. This strategy aims to strike the \u201cAxis of Resistance\u201d to ensure Israel\u2019s security and the continuation of American control over the region, thereby preserving its interests. This would also weaken Russia\u2019s influence and tighten pressure on it, while limiting the expansion of Chinese interests in the region by blocking the advance of China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative across the Middle East and Africa toward Europe. It also aims to establish an alternative economic corridor from India to the Middle East and then to Europe via Israel, and to enhance India\u2019s role as a manufacturing and production hub for Western companies as an alternative to China.<\/p>\n

The Israeli and American confrontation with Iran represents a pivotal point in this war, given the role of the Islamic Republic as a primary source of support for the factions of the Axis of Resistance in the region, whether in terms of arming, training, and financing, or even transferring expertise in manufacturing certain weapons, especially missiles and drones. Moreover, Israel and the United States represent the main enemy of Iran in the political doctrine of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Hence, Iran\u2019s nuclear program and its missile and military manufacturing programs constitute a serious threat to Israel and the United States, despite differences in approach between the American and Israeli sides in dealing with the Iranian threat. While Israel builds its approach to confronting Iran\u2019s nuclear and weapons programs on a military and security option, the United States\u2014at least since the Obama administration\u2014has based its approach on betting on containing Iran, ultimately aiming to bring about political change within it from the inside. This would be achieved by fostering liberal and Western-oriented tendencies, and by supporting and infiltrating\u2014or even generating\u2014opposition movements, including protest, youth, and women\u2019s movements. This is coupled with an economic strangulation strategy intended to undermine internal stability, paving the way for \u201ccolor revolutions\u201d and \u201ccreative chaos\u201d within Iran.<\/p>\n

However, Israel strongly sought, in the aftermath of the Al-Aqsa Flood, to draw the United States into adopting its military approach in dealing with the Iranian file, and succeeded in drawing Iran into a military confrontation that the Islamic Republic had long avoided, due to considerations related to its readiness and the timing of a major confrontation with Israel, in which the United States would not remain on the sidelines. Yet the assassination strikes that Iranian forces were subjected to in Syria\u2014especially the assassination of Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi in an airstrike targeting a building attached to the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, 2024\u2014followed by the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31, 2024, and then the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon alongside Deputy Commander of the Quds Force Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan on September 27, 2024, were of such intensity that it was impossible for Iran not to respond, regardless of its reservations about being drawn into a direct confrontation with Israel and the United States. Thus, Iran\u2019s first direct military action against Israel took place on April 13 as a response to the assassination of Brigadier General Zahedi in Damascus. This response was symbolic and probing in nature rather than strategic. It was followed by an Iranian strike involving hundreds of heavy, precise, and hypersonic missiles against Israel on October 1, just days after the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The second Iranian strike and the Israeli response to it on October 26 demonstrated that each side is capable of striking the other and targeting its strategic sites, without either possessing sufficient air defense systems to fully protect its strategic assets from such attacks. Accordingly, what remains central is the extent to which each side relies on achieving its objectives through these strikes, and the effectiveness of the air and missile capabilities each possesses. Israel, for its part, relies on its superiority in air power, equipped with precise and \u201csmart\u201d missiles with high destructive and penetration capabilities, particularly its combat aircraft, which it has strengthened in recent years with F-35 jets. These aircraft possess advanced stealth and infiltration capabilities, strong firepower, long operational range, electronic warfare capacity, and multi-mission versatility. Israel also continues to rely, as previously noted, on its ability to draw the United States into direct involvement should the confrontation with Iran escalate.<\/p>\n

All of this took place at the height of the United States\u2019 preoccupation with its own presidential election campaign, during which both domestic and foreign files\u2014no matter how controversial or \u201cdirty\u201d\u2014are often exploited by either of the two parties, the Democratic Party or the Republican Party, to serve its electoral interests. Accordingly, in the final months of President Joe Biden\u2019s Democratic administration, the U.S. administration worked to regulate the pace of tensions and mutual military strikes between Israel and Iran, keeping them within limits that would prevent the region from sliding into a full-scale confrontation that the U.S. administration could not ignore\u2014thereby avoiding being drawn into a conflict that would not serve its electoral interests. In this context, Washington provided Israel with defensive military and intelligence assistance in order to limit the effectiveness of Iranian missile strikes on the one hand, and to restrain Israel in selecting sensitive targets inside Iran on the other. However, these tensions between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other are expected to undergo changes in the coming period, in light of the return of President Donald Trump to the White House, as well as developments in the ground war in southern Lebanon and the broader confrontations unfolding across the region.<\/p>\n

It is also likely that Donald Trump\u2019s electoral victory in the current presidential race could plunge not only Gaza and Lebanon, but the entire region, into a broad and prolonged wave of Israeli bloodshed and violence, given his well-known hardline positions on regional issues. These positions include his extreme pro-Israel stance, which goes beyond official U.S. policy, whether regarding Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the 1967 territories, or his calls for expanding Israel\u2019s borders. They also extend to his approach toward Iran and its nuclear, missile, and aerospace programs, where Trump does not hesitate to support a decisive military strike against Iran that would go beyond ending its nuclear program to potentially targeting the Islamic Revolution\u2019s governing system itself. From this perspective, discussions have begun to emerge about the possibility of providing Israel with American strategic bombers and heavy bunker-busting munitions for this purpose. Some Western reports indicate that Israel does not possess sufficient military technology to destroy Iran\u2019s nuclear program, due to the dispersion of its facilities across a wide geographical area, with some sites heavily fortified deep inside mountains. Destroying such facilities would require the use of GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs, each weighing 12\u201314 tons, deployed by U.S. B-2 Spirit stealth bombers. This, in turn, limits Israel\u2019s ability to eliminate Iran\u2019s nuclear program without direct American military participation in the operation, or without acquiring access to such bombers and munitions.<\/p>\n

The names of the figures that Trump has begun selecting for his upcoming administration also reflect his orientations and perceived aggressive intentions toward the Palestinian cause, the Axis of Resistance, and Iran. His nominee for Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, expresses extreme positions on various international issues, including the Palestinian cause, Iran, the Gaza war, and the International Criminal Court. His nominee for Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, has called for the destruction of Gaza and is among the known supporters of launching a U.S. military strike against Iran. This orientation is similarly reflected in his nominee for National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, who expresses strong support for the Netanyahu government and advocates for a U.S. policy of deterrence against Iran and China, which he describes as an existential threat to the United States. Likewise, Mike Huckabee, Trump\u2019s nominee for U.S. Ambassador to \u201cIsrael,\u201d expresses rejection of the two-state solution or even considering the West Bank as occupied territory.<\/p>\n

2 \u2013 The Iranian role<\/strong><\/p>\n

Iran, in contrast, insists on supporting the Axis of Resistance regardless of the level of threats it faces. It relies defensively on the precise and hypersonic missile systems it possesses, which are capable of striking strategic centers within the Zionist entity with barrages that Israeli air defense systems cannot fully intercept. The ballistic and cruise missile systems developed by Iran, as well as by other actors within the Axis of Resistance, are characterized by advanced technical specifications\u2014whether in terms of speed or maneuverability and stealth capabilities. These features make them largely capable of bypassing Israeli or Western air defense systems. This was demonstrated by the Iranian missile strike launched against Israel on October 1, 2024, in which the majority of the missiles reportedly reached their targets despite Israel\u2019s layered air defense systems. This is also reflected in the missile attacks carried out by other members of the Axis of Resistance, particularly in Yemen, extending toward the Red Sea and reaching as far as the Indian Ocean to the east and the Israeli entity to the west.<\/p>\n

Iran also relies on loitering (suicide) drones capable of accurately targeting sensitive military centers and points in Israel, including air defense platforms and mobile equipment. These drones have already proven successful on multiple fronts, starting with the war in Ukraine, where Iranian \u201cShahed\u201d drones were used by Russia and demonstrated their effectiveness in that conflict. In addition, drones used by Axis of Resistance forces\u2014whether in Lebanon, Yemen, or Iraq\u2014have often succeeded in penetrating air defense systems in Israel or those deployed by U.S. and Western naval forces in the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Arabian Sea. They have struck sensitive and strategic targets, both inside Israel and across maritime zones extending from the Red Sea and Arabian Sea to the Indian Ocean. All of these capabilities are expected to be activated in the event of a large-scale confrontation between Israel and the United States on one side, and the Axis of Resistance on the other.<\/p>\n

In addition, Iran is betting that the United States will not dare to directly join Israel in any aggression against it, as such a move could expose dozens of U.S. military bases across the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant to danger. It could also open the entire Middle East to chaos and retaliatory reactions that would not serve U.S. interests, including the potential loss of control over oil markets, maritime transport routes, and strategic straits, as well as the security of American interests and allied or partner states in the region. This, in turn, may contribute to keeping the United States away from direct confrontation with Iran\u2014especially since incoming U.S. President Donald Trump, during his previous term, preferred not to involve the United States in direct wars, as long as there were actors willing to fight on its behalf.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In the mid-1990s, Benjamin Netanyahu wrote in his book A Place Among the Nations<\/em> that \u201cthe Palestinian who chooses to live in the West Bank must accept the fact that he has chosen to be a minority in an area under the authority of the Jewish state. He has no right to demand a second Palestinian state in the West Bank.\u201d He also argued that \u201cin light of technological military advances, smart bombs, missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction, any Arab leader who insists on going to war must take into account the possible consequences of such a war: that he may find his army destroyed, his capital destroyed, his regime in danger, and perhaps even lose his life.\u201d What Netanyahu outlined decades ago is, in many respects, being implemented on the ground today. And while he has achieved part of this vision\u2014if not through Israel alone, then with the support of the United States and other imperial powers\u2014he continues to pursue the remaining part through the wars he is currently waging in Gaza, Lebanon, and the wider region. However, he did not take into account that the long-term pacification of Arab regimes and armies would not necessarily guarantee the completion of that vision. The neutralization of most Arab armies and official state actors from the equation of liberating occupied territories and restoring Palestinian rights has instead produced popular resistance movements emerging from within Arab societies. These movements have disrupted Israel\u2019s military superiority in the region, and advanced weapons such as smart bombs and precision missiles are no longer exclusive to Israel, as Netanyahu once envisioned. Nor are Israel\u2019s elite forces still uncontested on the battlefield. Israel has reached a point where it can no longer wage war against Arab resistance forces alone. It is now fighting in Gaza and Lebanon with clear direct and indirect American involvement across military, intelligence, informational, and financial levels. Israel is also betting on drawing the United States into deeper involvement in this war in order to achieve a strategic victory. The key question, then, is whether Donald Trump\u2019s return to the White House would provide Israel with what it seeks from this war. The answer will largely determine whether the conflict moves toward resolution or expands further. As things stand, the trajectory suggests that the war remains open to greater escalation and widening cycles of violence across the region.<\/p>\n

Therefore, the Palestinian cause, the Levant, and the Middle East as a whole stand at a pivotal historical moment: either the Palestinian issue will regain its central position in the Arab and international arenas, and the peoples of the Arab and Islamic worlds will preserve a minimum level of rights, dignity, and a free and independent future; or the region will enter a new turning point marked by historical and civilizational defeat and setback. All of this depends, to a large extent, on the outcomes of the major confrontation taking place in the region today, and on the balance of power on the frontlines of combat\u2014especially the southern Lebanon front, which represents the first line of defense in this confrontation.<\/p>\n

Related Book:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Lebanon and al-Taif: A Historical Intersection and a Discontinued Course<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Related Post:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Peace in Lebanon and the Middle East\u00a0<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction One year after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the war that followed in Gaza, events along the Lebanese\u2013Israeli border escalated […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":148504,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8787],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-148503","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-studies"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nThe 2024 Lebanon War and the Future of Conflict in the Middle East - Centre for Arab Unity Studies<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The 2024 Lebanon War appears as a prelude to a war aimed at eliminating Hezbollah, within a broader project to strike the Axis of Resistance.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" 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